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ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
IN DEFENSE OF MEDIOCRITYf
HAROLD

BROWN*

INTRODUCTION

After five years of toiling, with three meetings each month, a
distinguished committee of the American Bar Association has conceptualized the first general revision of the Canons in this century,
including a complete set of Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules. Since the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by the ABA in August, 1969, effective January 1, 1970, three minor
amendments were approved in 1970. Although the Code is technically
binding only upon members of the ABA, it has already been enacted in
twelve states and is actively under consideration in numerous other
jurisdictions.' Because of the sweeping changes proposed by the new
Code, every attorney has an obligation to familiarize himself with its
terms, not only as a matter of self-interest, but for the benefit of the
profession itself and the society it serves.
At the same time, in spite of its prestigious credentials, the Code is
fairly subject to critical appraisal as a whole and in its detailed provisions! While some bar associations may mistakenly gloss over the
proposal in brief hearings before unrepresentative committees, it should
t Copyright 1970 by Harold Brown.
* Member, Massachusetts Bar.
1. As of June 15, 1970, of the 12 states that have adopted the Code as the standard
governing the practice of law to date, the following states have adopted it without change:
New Hampshire, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Arkansas and Oklahoma.
The following states have adopted it with certain amendments: Illinois, Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado.
In Nebraska the only change that was made in adopting the Code was the exclusion
of Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D) (5) which was referred to the state Judicial Council for
further study. In Kansas the Code was adopted without change except that the Ethical
Considerations were approved in principle rather than adopted.
In the following states the Code has been approved by the state bar association without change and recommendation for adoption has been made to the state supreme court:
Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ohio, Indiana and Minnesota.
In the following states the Code has been approved by the state bar association with
certain changes and has been recommended for adoption to the state supreme court:
Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, District of Columbia and Virginia.
2. See, e..q., Symposium-The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, 48 TEXAS L. Rxv. 255 (1970) [the articles cited from the Texas Law
Review below are contained in this Symposium]. Perhaps after five years of deliberation,
the Association felt impelled to act, but the number of unresolved issues would appear to
indicate that the action was premature.
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be emphasized that much more is demanded since the adoption of the
Code by court decree will have the effect of binding legislation. As such,
the judiciary should first afford the widest latitude to analysis and
criticism by every member of the bar as well as by bar associations.
It would indeed be difficult to quarrel with the platitudes contained
in the newly stated Canons as each of them simply describes a noble
goal, namely:
A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession.
Canon 2: A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in
Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available.
Canon 3: A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law.
Canon 4: A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client.
Canon 5: A Lawyer Should Exercise Independegnt Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client.
Canon 6: A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently.
Canon 7: A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law.
Canon 8: A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal
System.
Canon 9: A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Professional Impropriety.
Canon 1:

Each of the Canons is then followed by a series of "Ethical Considerations" consisting of numbered paragraphs with discursive exposition
of the generalities stated in the respective Canon.8 There then follow
the Disciplinary Rules themselves, which speak in statutory form
and obviously lay the basis for judicial review of professional misconduct with a view toward censure, suspension or even disbarment for
their violation.
Perhaps most significantly, there are no procedural provisions to
indicate the manner in which the Canons may be implemented and the
forum to which resort may be had. Similarly, there are no provisions
for judicial review. Perhaps it was intended that each state should adopt
its own procedures, either directly or indirectly, through statewide or
3. To a large extent, the Ethical Considerations are synopses of rulings or comments under the prior Code of Ethics. Where the Canons represent a substantial modification, the Ethical Considerations are of problematic value.
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local bar associations, the attorney general, district attorneys, special
court proceedings or by the highest court of each state. As will be seen,
the substantive features of the Disciplinary Rules are such as to make
the procedural matters of crucial importance. Significantly, in the thirty
states which have adopted the "Unified Bar," it is conceivable that
matters of discipline may well repose in completely non-judicial, as well
as non-governmental, forums.4
Although it would hardly be feasible to review all of the fortyeight pages which comprise the Code in this article, it should be stressed
that much of its content deserves the staunch support of every member
of the bar. The criticism contained in this article should therefore be
considered individually rather than as a broad attack upon the Code in
its entirety. Nevertheless, some specific matters raise such serious questions of morality and judgment that, without major revisions, the Code
is not to be commended for adoption.
THE CODE'S DUTY To BE AN INFORMER
In the Disciplinary Rules under Canon 1, it is broadly stated that
a lawyer shall not "Violate a Disciplinary Rule."' Having thus incorporated all of the extensive Disciplinary Rules by reference, it is then
ordered that:
A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.'
Although the rule is limited to "unprivileged information," it nevertheless adopts an affirmative duty of reporting all "knowledge of a violation," any violation of which will in itself subject the non-reporter to
the discipline of the Code. There would thus be enacted an informer
system with each attorney legally bound to police his brother attorney."
Such a rule would go far beyond the bounds of "guilt by association"
4. Where continued -membership in the local bar association is a prerequisite to
the right to practice under the "Unified Bar" system, suspension by the local bar may
raise serious constitutional questions. See Lough v. Varsity Bowl, Inc., 14 Ohio App. 2d
175, 237 N.E.2d 417 (1967), which held a corporate by-law that would foreclose resort to
the courts constitutionally void.
5. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1, Disciplinary Rule
1-102(A) (1) [hereinafter Disciplinary Rules will be cited DR].
6. DRI-103(A).
7. Assuming that policing requires professional cooperation, the infamous Gestapo
system would appear less effective than a requirement of cooperation on request and an
affirmative obligation to assist laymen in the prosecution of complaints. See Weckstein,
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEXAS L. REv.
267, 282 (1970).
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since there is no limit as to the source of such "knowledge" so long as
it emanates from "unprivileged information."
For example, a later rule provides penalties for the negligent
practice of law.' Apparently, if an attorney observes the incompetent
argument of a motion or trial of a case while innocently sitting in a
courtroom waiting for his own matter to be reached, it will be incumbent
upon him to volunteer a full report of the "knowledge" so obtained
since failure to report will subject the observer to disciplinary action.
While such a risk can be discreetly avoided by remaining in the courtroom corridor, such a burden cannot be escaped when it is based on
observations made during the negotiation of a lease or other contractual
matter in which one's opponent displays an apparent lack of "competence." Inefficient reporting of such incompetence may in itself constitute negligence.
Since the obligation to report violations pertains to all of the
Disciplinary Rules, every attorney would be well advised to study the
rules meticulously because it will surely be held that every attorney is
"presumed to know the law," both as a prime offender and as a nonreporter of violations by others.
Before leaving the objective consideration of this Rule, it may also
be asked whether it is a violation for Attorney A to fail to report that
Attorney B failed to inform on Attorney C. The standard of conduct now
requires that Attorney B fulfill his obligations as an informer." It is
clear that many such questions are left unanswered by the Code.
THE CODE'S DUTY

To BE "COMPETENT"

Perhaps the most interesting innovation is the command that a
lawyer shall not "neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." 10 In disarmingly simple language, the rule would now expose all counsel not
only to civil liability for neglect, but also to the risk of disbarment. The
hurried conveyancer who overlooks a last minute real estate attachment
can no longer find solace in prompt coverage from his personal funds,
particularly since the negligence must be reported by the attorney for the
attaching creditor lest the latter himself be in violation. The commercial
practitioner had best become aware that many bankrupt estates are
potential claimants under the antitrust laws and that overlooking the
filing of such a claim could lead to counsel's disbarment. Though the
& DR6-101 (A) (1-3).
9. Coupled with the requirements on "competence," discussed in ra, the reporting
obligation may be an invitation to harassment of one's adversary, particularly if he is a
neophyte.

10. DR6-101(A) (3).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss1/6
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degree of the negligence could mitigate the punishment, the rule itself
would brook no exceptions.
Lest such threat be narrowly constured, the companion rule specifies
that a lawyer shall not
[h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should know that
he is not competent to handle, without associating with him
a lawyer who is competent to handle it."
Under this rule, it would be no defense that the matter was successfully
concluded without negligence. There are, of course, some other pitfalls
in the rule such as the unspecified standards for "competence,"'" not
merely in the attorney's self-analysis, but also in that of selecting an
associate. Since "competence" must depend on the difficulty of the
client's problem, presumably young attorneys will of necessity spend
much time seeking confirmation of their competence and even more to
canvassing experienced attorneys until they find one of sufficient selfassurance to gamble on his own competence.
Presumably "competence" will be considered in the dynamic sense,
not merely in the attorney's static ability.18 The skill of a neophyte
willing to make a thorough research of the law as well as an exhaustive
analysis of the facts may have to be balanced against that of the leader of
the Bar who may first receive the case the night before trial with an
investigator's sloppily prepared file. On the other hand, such a liberal
interpretation may not be feasible if "competence" is to be judged in the
abstract, as in some Orwellian file of every attorney's capabilities.1"
11. DR6-101(A)(1).
12. Competence is related to a specialization in the practice of law, and the

lawyer who accepts employment outside of his speciality is subject to disciplinary action.
Wallace, The Code of Professional Responsibility-Legislated Irrelevance, 48 TEXAs L.
REV. 311, 323 (1970). Such a myopic definition would assure the fragmentation of the
practice, consolidate the dominating position of major law firms with their panorama of
specialists and demoralize the general practitioner as well as the neophyte. Cf. the prohibitions on fee splitting, DR2-107(A) (1-3), with the risk of client-stealing by the
specialists to whom a client may be referred. The inherent pressure to induce lawyers to
specialize could constitute a disservice to the public; even though the general practitioner
cannot "know all the law," neither can the specialist provide a balanced, all-around viewpoint.
13. Although the Ethical Considerations would direct an attorney to decline
"employment in a matter in which he is not and does not expect to become so qualified,"
Ethical Consideration 6-3 (emphasis added), the Code would not appear to permit
reliance on such an expectancy.
14. For a complete discussion of specialization, including the absence of any standards or procedures for certification, continued qualification and notice, see Wallace,
The Code of Professional Responsibility-Legislated Irrelevance, 48 TEXAs L.
(1970).
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Finally, the rules would specifically preclude any contractual provision for exoneration1 5 so that no matter how enthusiastic or confident
the client may be, and no matter how insistently he may want the
particular attorney, the latter must boldly decline to accept the engagement if any lurking doubt exists. Such limitation on exoneration should
be contrasted with the customary limitations provided in many formal
trusts, particularly where a bank or similar institution assumes fiduciary
obligations. Although such full-blown trustees usually require exoneration except for wilful neglect or fraudulent self-preference, the attorney
who might so provide would thereby violate a rule, even the "attempt"
at exoneration being proscribed.
The supposed justification for the compentency rules is quite
revealing. In the notes, reliance is placed on the fact that with "concentration within a limited field . . . greater . . . proficiency and expertness . . . can be developed,"" quoting from the Report of the Special
Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education." Such a
thrice "special" pronouncement would appear difficult to contest were
it not for the fact that a general disenchantment with the merits of
specialization has at last begun to reach not only the legal, but the
medical profession as well. Yet, while general practitioners are content
to let specialists live in their own rarified atmosphere, apparently the
specialists have now decided to preempt the entire field.
The non-sequitur in the final justification for this rule apparently
escaped the editorial committee when it simply quoted figures from the
Annual Report of the Committee on Grievances of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York to the effect that "of the 828 offenses
against clients . . . 452, or more than half of all such offenses, involved
neglect."" Apparently, that simple quotation from a newspaper summary
justifies the outlawing of "neglect" and the ostracism of any attorney
guilty of such conduct. Whether such "neglect" was aggravated or
consisted of excusable oversight will never be known; the rule does not
permit any such distinction. It is as revealing as another blind conclusion to the effect that "[i]f the attorney is not competent to skillfully
and properly perform the work, he should not undertake the service,"
citing a civil liability case, not a disbarment proceeding."
Rather than pursue this inquiry into the competency of the re15. DR6-102(A).
16. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 6, Note 2.
17. 79 ABA RE'. 582, 589 (1954).
18. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 1968, at 4, col. 5.
19. Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, 481, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922),
aff'd, 236 N.Y. 669, 142 N.E. 328 (1923).
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porters or their obvious preference for the specialist, who is almost
necessarily associated with a large law firm, it would appear perfectly
clear that the rules on "competence" are completely unworkable, excessively harsh and ill-designed to accomplish the obviously desirable goal
that "[a] lawyer should represent a client competently."2 Perhaps a
few comments by an experienced general practitioner may broaden the
scope of inquiry.
It may be assumed that perhaps ninety percent or more of all
attorneys would classify themselves as general practitioners,2 1 perhaps
by choice and possibly to reflect the nature of the legal services most
generally required in the broad stretches of the nation. But even in the
urban centers where large firms abound with a plethora of specialists, it
has become quite obvious that the absence of a correlation of the
"specialist's" services is a serious problem which has been compounded
by the fact that the availability of such services is severely restricted by
the financial limitations of most clients. If this would appear to be a
defense of mediocrity, let it be known that in each attorney's sphere of
activity, there may well be the finest sense of accomplishment and professionally rendered service.
Without categorizing questions of competence as a disbarrable
offense, perhaps there are other avenues for achieving that goal. Commencing with higher standards in the law schools or even a radical
revamping of their curricula, one might more closely examine the standards for admission to the Bar and even a more general requirement of
clerkships after admission. Perhaps lawyers should be encouraged to
emulate the medical profession where it is customary for the experienced
and specialists to donate a substantial portion of their time to instruct
20. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 6.
21. The general practitioner usually handles a sampling of torts, collections, conveyancing, divorce, corporations, estates and criminal matters. Other than in the classical
specialties of patents, trademarks and admiralty, there are a limited number of
complex matters requiring a specialist and the clients who require and can afford
such services are even fewer. The fact is that tens of millions never consult an attorney.
This is not because they do not need one but because of lack of finances or recognition
of their rights. Cf. Wallace, The Code of Professional Responsibility-Legislated
Irrelevance, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 311, 312-17 (1970), particularly the author's unsupported
assertion that the sentiment of the legal profession in America is represented by the
conclusion of the Special Committee on Specialization that
an increase in the number of lawyers who specialize in and of itself would
improve the overall quality of total services rendered by lawyers to their
clients, simply because those lawyers who specialize will have an opportunity
to concentrate their experience and their continuing legal education.
ABA Special Committee on Specialization, Rep. 33, at 6 (Jan. 1969). Clients seldom
seek advice on an isolated matter and the wide range of skills of a general practitioner
are probably of a greater value to most clients than specialists deign to acknowledge.
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and assist neophytes."2 Rather than relying on the secret and privately
administered rating system of the leading law list, with extensive
advertising allowed by those who somehow achieve such ratings, '
thought might be given to community acknowledgement of professional
achievement in plans administered on a purely objective basis by bar
associations or even governmental authority. For example, in England
law lists are severely restricted with regard to ratings, advertising and
exclusivity in their listings, and it is the government which designates
outstanding members of the Bar as "Queen's Counsel." The encouragement of excellence by appropriate incentives would enhance the image of
the Bar and increase its capacity to serve the community.
Such a constructive approach should be contrasted not only with
the capital threat of disbarment and demoralization of a Bar compelled
to inform on itself, but also with the practical result that every disgruntled client will have immediate power to blackmail his attorney on
fee matters no matter how fairly established or willingly paid in advance.
With fifty percent of most litigants losing their cases, the extent of
disappointment may easily turn to wrath for counsel's supposed incompetence.
THE CODE AND LEGAL FEES

The principal fiat on fees is the prohibition of an agreement, charge
or collection of "an illegal or clearly excessive fee,"2 4 the existence of
which would be found when "a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be
left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." 25 Because numerous state and local bar associations also provide
minimum fee schedules, the rule should be considered in the light of
such local arrangements. Contrary to the advice of the ABA under the
previous Canon 12 that such "minimum fee schedules can only be suggested or recommended and cannot be made obligatory," 8 many pressures
undoubtedly are exerted to enforce such schedules, particularly in the
27
thirty or more states which have adopted the "Unified Bar.
22. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1.
23. See DR2-102(A) (6) which even permits such advertisements to list the
names of clients regularly represented. "It can scarcely be denied that permitting
publication of your name in Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory with a rating of
'a v i g' is a form of self-laudation." Smith, Canon 2, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 285, 295 n.51
(1970).
24. DR2-106(A). For a more complete discussion of fee problems see Brown,
Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw. L.J. 565 (1970).
25. DR2-106 (B).
26.

ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS 302 (1961).

27. While holding that a minimum fee schedule can never be mandatory and
that a lawyer can never be subject to disciplinary action merely because he fails to
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Ethical considerations aside, all of such measures concerning minimum or maximum fees must be considered in light of the letter, as well
as the spirit, of the federal antitrust laws and various state statutes of
similar import. Under the federal statute,2 8 both minimum and maximum 0 price maintenance constitutes a per se violation. Wherever
attorneys have subscribed to such schedules, there is an express contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The violation is even
greater where attorneys are subject to reprimand or censure for infractions, and, as with price-fixing violations, the Supreme Court has
cast doubt on even the mildest arrangements by condemning "consciously parallel action."'" Apparently unimpressed by either ethical or
economic considerations, the government has recently instituted an injunctive suit against a real estate broker's association and its members
where the latter agreed not to accept multiple listings except at the
"recommended" commission rates. 2 Aside from the minimum fee
schedules of local associations, the ABA Code prohibits not only "clearly
excessive fees," but affirmatively requires the policing of such maximum
fees by all other attorneys.8"
There is no known or readily suggested basis for exempting legal
services from the impact of the antitrust laws. Although some may
suggest that many legal matters do not come within the "flow of interstate commerce" now used as the jurisdictional test for the federal
statute, such would hardly appear true for most corporate and commercial transactions. Even as to wholly intrastate matters, many states
have adopted antitrust laws patterned after either the Sherman Act or
follow a minimum fee schedule, in its most recent pronouncement in ABA

COMM. ON

323 (1961) the Standing Committee on Ethics has
nevertheless quoted with approval ABA COMIM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS 302
PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS, OPINIONS

(1961) in the following language: "[T]he habitual charges of fees less than those
established by a minimum fee schedule . . . may be evidence of unethical conduct ...."

Furthermore, the Committee quoted from and reaffirmed ABA
ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS 585 (1962):

COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL

[E]vidence that the lawyer whose conduct is under scrutiny had habitually
charged fees less than those suggested or recommended by a minimum fee
schedule adopted by his local bar association . . . would be admissible as being
material and relevant [and] . . . might be evidence of unethical conduct.
28. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
29. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
30. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1945). See also Milgram
v. Loew's, Inc. 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
32. United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 45,069, at 52,740 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 1969) ; United States v. Cleveland Real Estate
Bd., 5 TRADE REG. REP. U45,070, at 52,774 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 1970).
33. DR1-103(A).
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the Federal Trade Commission Act. 4 Although the antitrust law adopted
in 1970 by New Jersey would specifically exempt non-profit associations
that recommend fee schedules as guidelines,3 5 neither such action nor
state adoption of the ABA Code would provide exemption from the
federal statute. Rather than quibble as to the applicability of such
anticompetitive regulations, it would seem that of all businessmen the
legal community should do all in its power to "avoid even the appearance
of professional impropriety," in the exact words of Canon 9.
Perhaps the other most salient fee matter in the Code is its prohibition of referral fees among lawyers even though the client consents
after full disclosure and the total fee does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation. 6 Since the rule would permit the division of fees only
"in proportion of the services performed and responsibility assumed by
each" attorney, at the very least it must be recognized as a radical
departure from widespread custom of long duration. Even if the Code is
not adopted in a particular jurisdiction, forwarding counsel would do
well to avoid entrapment either under the aegis of the ABA or in the state
of the receiving attorney where such a provision of the Code may have
been adopted.
There may, of course, be some question as to whether this entire
provision constitutes undue meddling, at least where the client knowledgeably consents and the total fee is reasonable. This is particularly
crucial among the trial counsel whose practice consists primarily of
referral work." Such specialists have become increasingly necessary
because of the notorious contraction in the number of able trial advocates.
Limiting the division of fees in "proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each" would necessarily be a matter of
hindsight, would complicate the negotiations after the fact and would
compound the business aspects by the ethical considerations introduced
by the Code.
THE CODE'S DUTY

To

INFORM

ON THE CLIENT

Serious questions are also inherent in the rule concerning the
disclosure of a client's fraud on a person or tribunal. 8 Under that rule, a
lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that
34.

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1969).

35. Antitrust Act
at 229).

§ 5(b) (5), N.J. REv.

STAT.

§ 56:9-5 (2 N.J. Sess. Laws 1970

36. DR2-107(A) (1-3).
37.

Inversely, the general practitioner who is induced by the Code to refer a client

to a specialist may well find most of his cases and income disappearing since theoretically
there are specialists in every field of the law.
38. DR7-102(B) (1).
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[h] is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
8"
tribunal.
It would appear that the italicized portion of the rule creates an affirmative duty of disclosure with problems akin to those requiring that
an attorney report any violation of the rules by another attorney.
Aside from the fact that an attorney's duties as an "informer" relate
to a client's fraud, as compared with a brother attorney's negligence,
even "fraud" is such an all-encompassing term that one may question if,
in fact, society's welfare requires such policing of a client by his own
attorney. By contrast, it may be recalled that large segments of the Bar
voiced grave protest when the Director of the FBI suggested that
attorneys had an affirmative duty to report a client's conduct of a
treasonous nature. Weighing the new principle against the well established doctrine of absolute confidence between client and attorney, it is
doubtful whether such drastic action should be required even in case
of a serious fraud. There will be many who would suggest that, at most,
an attorney's duty at that juncture would call for his termination of
representation, lest he become a participant in the fraud. Even so, it
might then be asked whether the proposed rule would not effectively bar
a fraudulent client from obtaining competent legal services.") At the
very least, clients would be entitled to a forthright declaration of such a
stringent rule prior to their entrapment by the only expert whom
society has provided for confidential disclosure and advice. Although
some may differ, a balancing of such considerations would appear to
indicate that this rule has exceeded the fair limits of required ethical
conduct.
THE CODE'S IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES

Finally, in the broadest frame of reference, the drafters of the Code
have seemingly sought to legislate on a matter of grave importance to
society as a whole, namely, the means of providing efficient and reasonably priced legal services for the great majorities in the middle class.
While taking cognizance of the fact that the wealthy are well represented
and that direct or indirect provision of services for the needy are laudable, the rules would severely restrict a lawyer's participation in organiza39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See Canon 2 regarding the duty to "make legal counsel available."
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tions designed to provide legal services for its members."'
While
excepting from the prohibition such offices as legal aid, public defender,
military legal assistance and bar association referral services, the crucial
exception for the general public would hew as closely as possible to the
exemption required by the Supreme Court in a series of recent cases
involving the provision by labor unions or certain social service organizations of free personal legal services for their members."2
The narrow scope of this permitted exception is most evident in the
severity of the condition that such activity will be allowed
only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the
services requires the allowance of such legal service, and only
if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
a. The primary purposes of such organization do not include
the rendition of legal services.
b. The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services
to its members is incidental and reasonably related to
primary purposes of such organization.
c. Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from
the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
d. The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in that matter."
Such begrudging concessions to the Constitution, limited to the
interpretation in effect at the time of the rendering of the legal services
and with the clearly implicit hope of a narrowing of the doctrines already
enunciated, reflect a bare bones approach that would shame a carrion.
Not content with the severity of the self-interest evident in the general
statement of the rule, the drafters sought to foreclose any seepage by
providing the four additonal conditions. It is, indeed, difficult to escape
the impression that, given the power, the ABA would have reversed
the Supreme Court, heedless of the broad social implications of the
Court's constitutional rulings in this highly sensitive area.
It is obvious that, aside from services for the wealthy and possibly
the poor, it is the broad spectrum of middle America which has been
41. DR2-103 (D).
42. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button4,

371 U.S. 415 (1963).
43. DR2-103(D) (5).
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economically foreclosed from reasonable access to competent legal services
of a general practitioner, let alone the services of the specialist given
such deference in Rule DR6-101 (a) (1). In a society of ever increasing
sophistication, it is distressing to note that, except in such necessitous
circumstances as a criminal charge, an auto tort, a conveyance of an
estate, tens of millions never see a law office in their lifetime. Persons
with annual incomes of $7,500 to $20,000, probably with a wife and two
or more children headed for college, can hardly afford cash fees of $500
or more, frequently the minimum requirement for competent advice
even on business matters with limited complications.
This economic problem may require a restructuring of established
patterns ranging from extended credit plans, 4 prepayment insurance
programs or even legal clinics supported in whole or in part by governmental funds.' It can hardly be thought that the need of such citizens
for legal services is any less than that of the labor union members
covered by the Supreme Court decisions. Rather than panic at the
thought of such an imagined threat to the profession, lawyers might
well find that a severe shortage of counsel will result from the demands
of this new mass of potential clients. From a completely selfish viewpoint,
some might speculate the rapid growth of the custom of having salaried
corporate counsel may presage far more financial damage to independent
practitioners; yet, no murmur has been heard on that front.
The basic criticism of the rule lies in its foreclosure of discussion
and debate by all of society, comparable to that which occurred in recent
efforts to solve similar medical cost problems. The almost unheralded
adoption of the rules by the ABA and already by twelve states, undoubtedly with many more to come, would become legally binding except
for congressional action or a constitutional ruling by the Supreme Court.
44. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has ruled that such a payment
method would be unethical. ABA COMM. on PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS

1120 (1969).

The use by lawyers of a special version of Bankamericard has been ap-

proved by the Oregon State Bar Association. Bankamericard for Attorneys Approved,
ORE. S. BAR BULL., Feb., 1970, at 11.
45. For a superb discussion of the need for group legal services, see Nahstoll,
Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrangements Under The Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR2-103(D)(5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48 TEXAS L REv. 334
(1970). Nahstoll, a member of the ABA Special Committee on Availability of Legal

Services since its inception, concludes that this provision of the Code is "unrealistic, inadequate, irresponsible, and unprofessional. It disserves both the public and the bar." Id.
at 350. An alternative proposal was submitted by the Committee on Availability of Legal
Services but was rejected by the ABA House of Delegates after it had been informed by
the Chairman of the Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards "that the lawyers of
America are not prepared to have group legal services extended." Id. at 348 n.35. Such
a disgraceful display of self-preference may well disclose motivation sufficient to vitiate
the very basis of the Code itself.
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It may well be asked whether such conduct by the Bar constitutes a per
se violation of Canon 9 which requires that "[a] lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety."
CONCLUSION

Although this discussion has been confined to some of the more
controversial provisions of the new Code, to large segments of the Bar
there would appear ample justification for vigorous action to defeat its
adoption and certainly to subject it to drastic amendment. But much
more would seem to be involved.
While proponents of the Code might consider this exposition little
more than a' defense of mediocrity, the illustrations intended to highlight
the deficiencies of the Code were in defense of tenets fundamental to the
protection of a free society. Though few could quarrel with the Canons
themselves, their implementation in the Disciplinary Rules demonstrates
such insensitivity to the basic rights of both attorney and client that
many will demand a total revision. For those who may now or hereafter
be subject to such rules of conduct, this discussion will have served a
useful purpose if only to make them aware of its Draconian concepts.
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